Beijing, 7th September, 2017 (BISTU)--- BISTU wins two awards of Second Prize achievements in the 14th Outstanding Achievements of Municipal Philosophy and Social Sciences, as is shown in public notice of Department of Publicity of CPC Beijing and Beijing Municipal Commission of Human Resources and Social Security. Prof. Qu Li’s Research on Lean Operation Mode of Knowledge Service Industry wins Second Prize of management discipline and Prof. YangYingmei’s Game Analysis of Sealed Bidding wins Second Prize of economics discipline.
Award on Outstanding Achievements of Municipal Philosophy and Social Sciences is governmental award set by CPC Beijing Municipal Committee and Beijing Municipal People’s Government and aimed at promoting prosperity of philosophy and social sciences researches in Beijing. It encourages academic researches, theoretical innovation and service for Beijing as the national capital. It is the most important provinciallevel award in the field of philosophy and social sciences corresponding to Achievements of National Philosophy and Sciences. More importantly, it represents the top academic level of philosophy and social sciences research in Beijing. The 2017 award , initiated in 2016, sees 202 prize winners inclusive of 45 First Prize winners and 157 Second Prize winners.
Introduction to BISTU achievements:
Research on Lean Operation Mode of Knowledge Service Industry, by Qu Li and Yin Jielin, takes knowledge service organizations as research objects. Based on lean operation developed from Toyota production methods, it proposes five dissipations in knowledge operation and analyzes formation process of value chain in knowledge service organizations. It offers development strategy and operational suggestions for knowledge service organizations. This research has substantial implications for improvement of service industry’s operation efficiency and decreasing of operation cost as well as construction and development of conservation oriented society.
Game Analysis of Sealed Bidding, by Yang Yingmei and Wang Wenju, centers on sealed bidding. Starting from relating factors which affect price quotation of bidders and bid inviting mechanism design, it explores tenderers’ strategy in bidding and reserve price, bidders’ quotation strategy, and expected revenue of both parties. The research could work as, to some extent, theoretical foundation and reference for tenderers choice of appropriate bidding method and confirmation of reasonable reserve price. It also offers suggestions for maintaining interest of both parties of bidding and further perfection and development of current bidding theories and system.